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Abstract
Lani Guinier's proposals were neither radical nor undemocratic. In fact, cumulative voting is more efficient,
democratic, and fair than the plurality rule single member district arrangement currently in use in most of the
United States that Guinier's critics held up as the paragon of democracy. The importance of these qualities,
especially to minorities in a pluralistic democracy, cannot be overstated. Efficient, democratic, and fair
electoral systems prevent government from ignoring minority rights and interests by turning mere
enfranchisement into empowerment, which in tum, affords minorities the same access to and proportionate
power in America's social, economic, and political institutions.
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Cumulative Voting 
and Single Member 
Districts in Industrial 
Organization 
by Joshua Yount 
The ideas of economists and political 
philosophers, both when they are right and 
when they are wrong, are more powerful 
than is commonly understood Indeed the 
world is ruled by little else. (Holcombe 1994, 
p.386) 
J.M. Keynes 
I am inclined to believe that monopoly and 
other imperfections are at least as important, 
and perhaps substantially more so, in the 
political sector as in the market place. 
(Becker 1976, p. 37) 
G. Becker 
L INTRODUCTION 
In 1993 Bill Clinton nominated Lani 
Guinier to head the civil rights division ofthe 
Department of Justice. Soon after, GuinieT's 
nomination became embroiled in controversy 
when the media and conservative legislators 
began to examine her writings on electoral 
remedies to Voting Rights Act violations. 
Almost immediately, Lani Guinier became 
~own as the "quota queen" and herwritings 
were derided as undemocratic and racially 
preferential. Still smarting from "nanny-gate," 
President Clinton quickly moved to avoid 
further attacks and withdrew Guinier's 
nomination. Foremost among the charges 
raised against Guinier was that her advocation 
of cumulative voting as an alternative to 
districting as a remedy for minority voting 
strength dilution represented an affiont to 
democracy and was designed to unfairly 
advantage minorities. Unfortunately, the truth 
was somehow lost in the fury of political 
maneuvering and press sensationalism. 
Lani Guinier's proposals were neither­ -­
radical nor undemocratic. In fact, cumulative 
voting is more efficient, democratic, and fair 
than the plurality rule single member district 
arrangement currently in use in most of the 
United States that GuinieT's critics held up as 
the paragon ofdemocracy. The importance of 
these· qualities, especially to minorities in a 
pluralistic democracy, cannot be overstated. 
Efficient, democratic, and fair electoral 
systems prevent government from ignoring 
minority rights and interests by turning mere 
enfranchisement into empowennent, which in 
tum, affords minorities the same access to and 
proportionate power in America's social, 
economic, and political institutions. 
Evidence to support the claimed 
superiority ofcumulative voting can be found 
in the literature on voting theory, comparative 
politics, public choice, and voting rights, but 
this study will focus on a relatively unexplored 
. approach to electoral systems. Single melTlber 
district, plurality rule will be compared to 
cumulative voting within the industrial 
organization paradigm, in order to examine 
each system's effect on competition, consumer 
choice, and democratic fairness. It will be 
argued that cumulative voting better reflects 
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consumer preferences and demand, induces 
more and better competition in elections, and 
prevents majority "monopolization" of the 
political process. As the United States and 
other nations begin to recognize the pluralistic 
nature of their societies, and as new nations 
embrace democracy -and individual liberty, 
cumulative voting is an alternative that should 
be, and incr~asingly is, considered for use. 
Therefore, this study is important in that it 
sheds light on cumulative voting and adds to 
the evidence supporting the system's use. 
First, voting in general will be analyzed and 
evaluated to assess the importance of different 
systems. Then, cumulative voting and single 
member district plurality rule will each be 
described and evaluated to provide an 
understanding ofthe qualities ofeach system. 
Next, the study will proceed to its central 
foals, evaluating both electoral systems within 
the industrial organization paradigm to 
determine each system's effect on competition, 
representation, and fairness. Finally, the 
evidence surrounding cumulative voting and 
single member districts generated by a review 
ofthe real world uses ofcumulative voting will 
be examined. 
As the u.s. and· other nations 
begin to recognize the 
pluralistic nature of their 
societies, and as new nations 
eDlbrace dennocracy and 
liberty, cunnulative voting is 
an alternative that should 
be...considered for use. 
II.	 VOTING SYSTEMS REALLY 
MATTER 
Voting systems generally have three phases 
that are open to variation; balloting, 
districting, and electoral formula (Rae 1967). 
Balloting is the "specification of the voter's 
role in deciding the election" (Rae 1967, p. 
16). In other words, balloting instmcts the,-.. 
voter how to vote in terms of the number of 
votes cast, the way the votes can be arranged, 
and whether voters vote for parties or 
candidates. Districting produces "the units 
within which voting returns are translated into 
distributions of parliamentary seats" (Rae 
1967,. p. 19). The importance ofthe districting 
process is that the magnitude of districts, or or' - ­
number of seats per electoral unit, detennines 
the degree ofproportionality ofrepresentation 
from the district (Rae 1967, p. 20). Electoral 
fonnulae provide the method of translating 
votes into outcomes, in essence deciding who 
won and who lost. There are primarily two 
types of fonnula in use,[1] the plurality rule, 
and proportional representation (PR). The 
plurality system elects the person or party with 
the most votes, regardless ofwhat portion of 
the total that is, as the only winner from' a field 
of candidates. Proportional representation, 
conversely, elects multiple candidates or 
parties according to their proportional strength 
in the electorate and the percentage needed10 
gain a seat. One additional concept supplies a 
fourth basis of differentiation among electoral . 
systems. The exclusion threshold is the 
percentage ofvotes needed to assure victory, 
although victory may be won with a lower 
amount. It is a function of the number of 
seats available in an election,[2] the more seats 
available the lower the exclusion threshold 
(Still 1992; Guinier 1994). Because different 
concepts, approaches, and combinations of 
approaches can be used in each phase of an 
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electoral system there is no limit on the 
number ofpossible electoral systems. 
The fact that in practice there are so many 
different electoral schemes is not without 
reason. All three phases ofan electoral system 
have an effect on the outcome of an election, 
thus different electoral systems that alter 
different phases of the process will cause 
different outcomes. In other words, electoral 
systems are not merely perfect mirrors that 
reflect voter preferences as electoral outcomes 
without affecting that outcome. The type of 
mirror used has a profound effect on how 
voter preferences are reflected (Lakeman 
1974, p. 29; Rae 1967; Arrow 1963; Guinier 
1994). . 
The fact that this_is true is borne out by the 
contentious arguments that surround decisions 
about how officials will be elected. For 
instance, in the American south, the entire 
history of electoral law since the civil war is 
~ased on attempts by one faction or another to 
control local government. Between the 1870's 
and the 1960's whites instituted electoral 
"reforms" that in addition to effectively 
disenfranchising blacks, made it impossible for 
minority candidates to be elected. Since the 
1960's minority interests through the federal 
government have manipulated electoral 
systems to guarantee a more egalitarian 
distribution ofrepresentation. Systems matter. 
A. SINGLE MEMBER DISTRICTS 
(SMD) 
The most common electoral system in the 
United States is the single member district with 
plurality rule. In terms of the three phases 
introduced above, SMD plurality rule specifies 
procedures for each. In the balloting phase, the 
voter is presented with a series of candidates 
and is asked to cast a vote for one. Districting 
in this system divides a geopolitical entity in 
which an election is taking place into equally 
populated districts,[3] equivalent in number to 
the quantity of seats available in the elected 
body.[4] Then the electoral formula, plurality 
rule, designates the one candidate in each 
district with the most votes as the winner. In 
addition, the exclusion threshold would be 
SOOh, therefore requiring a candidate to receive 
half the electorates votes to be guaranteed 
victory. For example, SMD would divide a 
state with a 35 person legislature into 35 
equally populated districts, from which voters, 
casting one vote a piece, would elect the top 
vote-getter from each district. 
Single member district plurality rule is the 
fonn that all congressional and almost all state 
legislative elections take. Also, though not as 
frequently, SMD is used for local and .. 
municipal elections. Its popularity today has 
two sources. The first is tradition. SMD 
originated in England during feudal times as 
the way the fiefdoms were represented to the 
King. Each feudal estate had a representative, 
thus it was the land that was the basis for 
representation. This system evolved, and with 
the addition of a representative for each 
medieval town, paved the way for the British 
Parliament. American colonists, in turn, 
adopted it from the British and made this 
system the foundation of their new republic 
(Guinier 1994). Recently, however, SMD has 
come into even greater use as corrective 
strategy to combat: at first Southern, but later 
nationwide, attempts to prevent minorities 
from having electoral power. By replacing 
at-large electoral systems that commonly 
dilute minority voting strength with SMD that 
takes advantage ofgeographic segregation to 
give minorities more control over their 
representatives, governments have taken a step 
to grant effective representation to groups that 
had previously been denied (Grofinan et al 
1982; Davidson and Korbel 1984). 
The widespread use of the single member 
district plurality rule system results from some 
33
 
particularly beneficial qualities that the system 
possesses in terms of representation and 
governance. SMD's strongest trait is its ability 
to represent the geographical groups within a 
geopolitical area. This quality is thought to 
foster many other important goals of a "fair" 
electoral system. First, the narrowed 
jurisdiction of single member districts, as 
opposed to a simple at large system, allows 
and encourages constituencies to become more 
active in supporting candidates because ofthe 
head to head nature of the election and the 
increased worth of a voter's vote. Second, a 
representative of a district is more likely to 
share the feelings of hislher constituency 
because representative's election depends only 
on the district's perception of himlher, rather 
than the entire geopolitical unit. Also, the 
representative is likely to reside in the district 
and thus will tend to share many of the 
constituent preferences. Finally, the 
representative will seem to be more accessible 
to constituents who can geographically identify 
the person who specifically represents them 
(Weaver 1984). 
In addition to the geopolitical benefits of 
SMD, stable two party governance is a 
consequence of the winner-take-all nature of 
plurality rule, which awards sole political 
. representation of an entire district to the 
plurality winner, no matter how fractured the 
electorate is. In other words, a SMD plurality 
system tends to promote stability by not 
reflecting many of the divisions within the 
electorate. A third area of benefit comes in 
terms ofminority representation, which can be 
aided through the geographic clustering of 
minorities that frequently occurs due to 
voluntary and involuntary segregation. 
Districts drawn to reflect this clustering will 
provide minorities with opportunities to elect 
their own representatives that may not have 
existed in an at-large system. The enforcement 
of the Voting Rights Act by the Federal 
government through the use of SMD to 
correct minority vote dilution reflects .this 
beneficial trait (Weaver 1984; Grotinan et al 
1982; Guinier 1994). 
On the other hand, SMD suffers from some 
shortcomings as well. One source ofproblems 
is the flipside of the geopolitical benefits 
discussed above. Close ties between 
representatives and constituents also have the 
negative effects of producing representatives 
with overly parochial concerns and allowing 
obscure district politics to go unscrut~ed. 
Even more fundamentally, however, creating 
geographic districts is well suited as strategy 
to extend representation only to the extent that 
interests are predominantly geographic.._­
Although this may have been true at one time, 
geography is no more determinative of 
political preferences than race, gender, or 
income today. In addition, the arbitrariness of 
creating districts, within a geopolitical entity 
leads to genymandering and the dismantling of 
smaller geopolitical entities in the name of 
party politics so that districts describe only a 
geographic area rather than any cohesive 
community (Weaver 1984; Guinier. 1994; 
Note 1982). 
It is completely unproductive 
from a social standpoint to 
perpetuate segregation by 
creating electoral structures 
that increase disincentives to 
integrate America's 
geopolitical entities. 
SMD makes two crucial, yet not 
completely accurate or helpful assumptions. 
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First, it is assumed that geography is a proxy 
for racial or ethnic minorities, and second that 
race or ethnicity is a proxy for political 
preferences that are being privileged. Racial 
and ethnic minorities are not always 
geographically segregated, Latinos in the 
Southwest are an example. Nor do all voters 
within a particular minority have the political 
leanings that are projected on them as a group. 
Therefore, single member districting is a weak 
strategy for improving minority representation. 
Furthermore, it is completely unproductive 
from a social justice standpoint to perpetuate 
segregation by creating electoral structures 
that increase disincentives to integrate 
America's geopolitical entities (Guinier 1994; 
Cole, Taebel, and Engstrom 1987; Note 
1982). 
In addition, single member districting can be 
and has been used to dilute minority voting 
strength in the same way it is used to dilute 
majority political monopolization. rhis is 
exactly how the majority monopolizes the 
political system in the first place. Furthermore, 
because the entire concept of districting to 
create certain majorities necessarily creates 
other minorities, at least one group's voting 
strength is arbitrarily being diluted when a 
district is created to combat the vote dilution 
facing another group. In the face ofthis, even 
a government concerned with fairness would 
have to choose which groups have the right to 
representation and in what amounts.[5] Also, 
the stable two party government resulting from 
winner-take-all plurality role prevents any third 
party from reinvigorating the political process, 
denies minorities, broadly defined, a voice in 
their representation, over represents the 
majority,[6] and wastes the votes of at least 
halfthe electorate.[7] (Weaver 1984; Grofman 
et al 1982; Still 1984; Guinier 1994; Note 
1982). 
B. CUMULATIVE VOTING (CV) 
35
 
Cumulative voting is a semi-proportional 
electoral system combining aspects ofpluraIity 
and proportional systems. In the balloting 
phase each voter is given a quantity of votes 
equal to the number of seats available within 
their district. Voters are then able to distribute 
their votes among the candidates in any way 
they wish, including placing multiple votes on 
individual candidates. For example, in a district 
with three seats up for election, a voter may 
place one vote on each ofthree candidates, or 
may place two votes on one candidate and one 
on another, or may place all three votes on one 
candidate.[8] Districting varies with CV, it 
could leave the geopolitical entity intact, 
thereby placing all voters in the same district, 
or it could divide the electorate into districts... 
When CV creates multiple districts, they are 
usually identifiable geopolitical subdivisions 
and do not necessarily have to be equally 
populated, because the seats available are 
apportioned to the districts according to 
population. By way of example, Lani Guinier 
suggests that ifCV were used in New York 
City, the city could be divided into its five 
boroughs and each borough would have a 
quantity ofcity council seats proportiC?nate to 
their respective populations (Guinier 1994, p. 
155). 
The electoral formula in CV is 
semi-proportional in that it elects more than 
one candidate, and thus is not 
"winner-take-all," and yet does not allocate 
seats in strict proportion to votes, but rather 
grants one seat to each of the winners, no 
matter how many votes they get. For instance, 
in a three seat race, the top three vote-getters 
in the election would each win a seat, even if 
the first place winner had twice as many votes 
as the second or third place winners. The 
exclusion threshold for this system is almost 
inversely proportional to the number of seats 
available. With five open seats, the exclusion 
threshold is 1/6 or 16.7%, thus requiring a 
candidate to gamer only little less than 17% to 
be guaranteed victory (Guinier 1994; 
Lakeman 1974, pp. 87-90; Still 1984). 
CV traces its roots to the Victorian age 
when the modern world began to overtake 
tradition, especially in the political realm. CV 
was part of a larger reform movement 
throughout Great Britain that wanted to open 
government up to the common people and 
minorities. South Africa, England, and the 
State of Dlinois all experimented with it to 
counteract potentially disruptive and tyrannous 
majority minority divisions, but the system 
never really caught on in any meaningful way. 
Although CV was never widely used, if has 
retained a following, and recently has been 
looked at more closely, as pluralist nations_ 
search for ways to give minorities a better 
chance to elect candidates (Lakeman 1974, pp. 
87-90; Everson et al1982; Guinier 1994). 
Cumulative voting is appealing for a 
number of reasons. The fact that it is not 
winner-take-aIl, but rather sends several 
repreSentatives to the legislature has a number 
of beneficial effects. First, there are less 
wasted votes because more voters voted for a 
winner. As a consequence of this, more 
individuals have a representative in the 
legislature. Finally, the existence of multiple 
open seats creates a low exclusion threshold 
that can prevent groups from being excluded 
from governing and encourages more 
candidates, as well as a larger variety of 
candidates to run for office. 
CV also improves the electoral prospects 
for ~ority voters, both narrowly and broadly 
defined. First, not having to rely on geography 
allows minority voting power to be felt even 
when that minority is not residentially 
segregated. Second, the elimination of race 
districting allows minorities to seek out 
cross-cultural alliances with sympathizers who 
may have been submerged in a majority district 
otherwise. This points to possibly the most 
beneficial aspect ,of cumulative voting, its 
facilitation of voluntary "districting." 
Throughout a geopolitical unit[9] in which CV 
is being used voters of similar interests can 
form "voluntary constituencies" based solely 
on their individual views rather than their 
geographic location or race. This allows 
government to stay out of the business of 
making assumptions about preferences, 
eliminates the need to perpetuate segregation, 
and induces voter participation among those 
formerly in "safe" districts. 
CV also ensures that those with the same 
views who now have their votes together, will 
not have those votes unfairly diluted in 'an 
at-large system. By allowing voters to express - - .­
the intensity oftheir preference by cumulating 
their votes, those who have strong 
preferences, even if they are smaIl in number, 
can be heard in the political process. 
Furthermore, CV reduces the politicking 
involved in drawing and redrawing district 
lines and picking which group is the majority 
in each district because the extent of CV 
jurisdiction is defined by natural geopolitical 
By allowing voters to 
express the intensity of their 
preference by cumulating 
their votes, those who have 
strong preferences...can be 
heard in the political 
process. 
divisions. Finally, CV causes the legislative 
body to be more proportionally representative 
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of the electorate, and therefore a more true 
reflection of the voters (Guinier 1994; Note 
1982; Weaver 1984; Still 1992; Everson et al 
1982). 
Cumulative voting also has drawbacks, 
however. Because it is more proportional, CV 
tends to be less stable as various groups battle 
for control. Furthermore, the procedures 
involved with CV can be -confusing and not all 
voters understand them, which can lead to an 
inaccurate vote. In addition, the fact that no 
representative is formally bound to a defined 
constituency could lead to a distance between 
voters and legislators that would be 
detrimental. Finally CV can entail major use of 
strategy by parties, candidates, and voters. 
Parties fully want to exploit their strength, but 
iftoo many oftheir candidates are competing, 
all their candidates could suffer. Candidates 
have to deal with these same issues when 
deciding to enter and if they want to support 
other candidates. Voters, who generally want 
to balance their votes between those 
candidates they most prefer, and those that 
they like, who need their vote the most, have 
strategic problems in CV elections as well 
(Note 1982; Weaver 1984; Everson et al 
1982). 
C.GOVERNMENTASMONOPOLY 
Because government is the only producer 
of political and policy outputs, and there can 
only be one government per market (national, 
state, local) at a time, government can be 
conceived of as a natural monopoly[10] 
(Tullock 1955, pp. 458-9). The concept is so 
common sense that government is not 
frequently thought of in these terms. For 
instance, the Bloomington city council has a 
monopoly on producing city ordinances, 
regulations, policies, expenditures, and certain 
services. An analysis ofgovernment within the 
industrial organization paradigm can provide 
some valuable ~ights into the role ofelectoral 
systems (Holcombe, 1994). 
Just as society faces alternatives in dealing 
with natural monopolies in industry, it must 
also decide how to treat the sovereign 
monopoly. Tullock cites three common 
approaches; laissez-faire non-control, 
regulation, and public ownership (1955, p. 
458). Ahands offapproach gives government 
the kind unacceptable free reign that has not 
been seen since the fall of the divine. 
monarchies. In addition it allows possessors of 
the monopoly rights to erect insurmountable 
barriers to entry. Public ownership surely 
exists, but it is public operation that is lacking. 
And . in view of Arrows impossibility 
theorem,[ll] the inevitability of self-interest in .. 
representation, and the massive costs of direct 
democracy, public operation is unlikely. 
Regulation is also unacceptable because ofthe 
undemocratic control it would necessitate. 
Although the Constitution, the Bill ofRights, 
and the common law all are examples of 
useful, and essential regulatory schemes 
designed to control government monopoly, 
regulation of this type over every aspect of 
governmental action is unwarranted because it 
would completely insulate government from 
"consumer sovereignty" (Holcombe 1994, p. 
146; Tullock 1955, p. 459). Consequently, 
another scheme must be relied on to restrain 
government monopoly power. 
From a market point of view, the best 
strategy would be to reduce the height of the 
entry barriers that allow monopolies to fight 
off challengers. Regular, competitive, 
democratic auctions of the publicly owned 
government'~ monopoly rights serve this 
function well. Candidates and parties bid for 
votes with promises of policy measures. 
Demetsz suggests this type ofcompetition will 
eat away any monopoly profits (Holcombe 
1994, pp. 146-7), and make government a 
reflection ofpopular sentiment. This analysis is 
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flawed however because it assumes perfect 
competition for the monopoly rights of 
government. 
1.	 Competition for govemment monopoly 
Non-competitive aspects of the electoral 
process have two sources; the status quo 
owner of monopoly rights,. and the electoral 
system itself: Because governments, or 
majorities in democratic nations, have almost 
unlimited monopoly power, government 
officials who want to continue to earn the 
benefits of monopoly power[12], will use 
those powers to help maintain their position. 
Examples of this type of behavior in the 
American political system abound. The 
seniority system in Congress gives voters 
incentive to keep re-electing their 
representative so that he/she can provide 
better pork to the district. Also campaign 
financing, franking privilege, and media 
coverage are all manipulated in favor ofsitting 
legislators (Holcombe 1994, p. 98). The 
degree to which American legislators can 
advantage themselves is fortunately limited by 
the competition introduced by the monopoly 
regulation found in the Constitutional 
commands placed on government (free press, 
free speech, regular elections, separation of 
powers, federalism) (Holcombe 1994, pp. 
146-7). 
Perhaps the greatest determinant of 
competition is a very subtle one in American 
politics, the electoral system. As was said 
above, the system matters. Likewise, different 
electoral systems can have quite different 
impacts on a political race. Certainly, the 
voting system employed contributes 
significantly to the number and quality of 
competitors and potential competitors by 
placing baniers on the quantity and positioning 
of competitors. Furthermore, candidate 
behavior will be different because electoral 
strategies are system specific (Greenberg and 
Shepsle, 1987).' Also, government will 
accurately reflect citizen preferences to 
varying degrees in different systems because 
some systems do better at transforming 
preferences into outcomes. Consequently, 
higher quality competition will occur when a 
community's political divisions are clearly 
expressed. 
Within the industrial organization paradigm, 
single member district plurality rule and 
cumulative voting can be seen as market 
structures in the market that determines who 
will govern. The market is the geopolitical 
voting unit, the firms are the various 
candidates, the good that is being offered is -, 
government policy, and the consumers are the 
electorate. Thus in each election, in each 
geopolitical unit, candidates design and offer 
their product in hopes of attracting voters, 
because the candidate(s) with the largest 
"market share" on election day will win the 
election. As described above, the elements of 
competition will vary among systems. It will 
be posited that SMD, because of the type of 
competition it engenders, is an oligopolistic 
market structure. Likewise, the competition 
involved in CV makes it a monopolistically 
competitive structure. 
2.	 8MD as Oligopoly 
An oligopoly exists in an industry when a 
small number of firms dominate the market. 
Similarly, a political oligopoly can be said to 
be present in the political market for the 
.	 government's monopoly powers when a few 
candidates and or parties dominate the 
electoral process. Certainly the two-party 
dominated history of elections in the U.S. 
under SMD plurality rule makes a prima facie 
case for the existence ofan oligopoly. There is 
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evidence, however, that oligopolies are 
inherent in single member plurality electoral 
systems. Douglas Rae in his examination of 
electoral laws finds a "very strong 
relationship" between plurality electoral 
systems and two party system (1967, p. 95). 
Likewise, Duvergers Law claims that the 
"plurality method, by discriminating against 
small parties, encourages a two-party system" 
(Lijphart and Grofman 1984, p. 5). 
Further evidence ofthe oligopolies nature 
of the American system can be found in 
manifestations of market power and the 
existence ofentry barriers. The Median Voter 
Model hypothesizes that in plurality single 
winner elections, where issues are one 
dimensional and voters preferences are single_ 
peaked, the candidate who has the support of 
the median voter will win. Because candidates 
in plurality elections attempt to maximize 
votes, in positioning their candidacy they will 
tend toward the median voter (Nicholson, 
199~,.p. 783; Downs, 1957, pp. 139-41). This 
effect tends to push candidates ideologically 
and policy~wise together. In this sense the 
political oligopoly model mirrors the kinked 
demand model ofoligopoly because candidates 
have a disincentive to change their platforms in 
any direction when they are at the equilibrium 
median voter position, just as firms will tend 
not to move from the kink in their demand 
curves. Another similarity ofthe convergence 
tendency is the Hotelling's principle of 
minimum differentiation which predicts 
competitors imitate each other, thus producing 
a standardized product (Shepsle and Cohen 
1990, p. 17). 
Still many scholars have discovered 
shortcomings of the Median Voter Model in 
plurality elections. First, an election with more 
than two candidates will not produce 
convergence (Shepsle and Cohen 1990; 
9rofinan 1993; Cox 1987). In addition, 
potential competition will prevent convergence 
in a two candidate race (Shepsle and Cohen 
1990, 28-29). These nonconvergence effects 
are militated against by the oligopolistic nature 
of SMD plurality rule, however. First, as 
discussed above, pluralities tend toward two 
competitor races, thus reducing the possibility 
of a multiple candidate race. Furthermore, an 
oligopoly's collusive tendencies preempt the 
introduction of other candidates, as the two 
candidates move apart on an ideological scale 
so as to prevent candidate entry on their 
ideological flanks.[13] This may reduce the 
threat ofa multiple candidate race, but it does 
not eliminate the possibility that a .new 
competitor could quickly enter and replace an 
old competitor.[14] 
In the face ofthis possibility, the oligopoly-­
must resort to entry barriers to reduce the 
residual threat of competition. These take at 
least three foons. The institutional barriers that 
the status quo government erects not only 
protect government monopoly power, but also 
preserve oligopolistic competition for that 
power through the electoral rules that are 
established. Also, the exclusion threshold of 
plurality rule is quite high at SOOA., thus 
providing a disincentive for third candidate 
competition. Finally, districting can reduce 
competition in two ways. It limits competition 
by making smaller the jurisdiction that elects a 
representative. In addition, the arbitrary nature 
of the districting tool allows and, in fact, 
encourages the creation of "safe districts", or 
the use of"vote dilution", which are designed . 
solely to undermine competition. Any 
remaining distance between the median voter 
and the positions taken by candidates to 
prevent entry, is lost in the candidates' 
intentional ambiguity which allows them to 
simultaneously converge on the median voter 
and appear to "hold down the fort." As Downs 
says, "...parties will try to be similar and 
equivocate" (1965, p. 137). In these ways 
oligopoly market power is used to reduce 
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competitiveness, while at the same time 
eliminate differentiation. 
3. CV as Monopolistic Competition 
Cumulative voting approximates 
monopolistic competition in form and 
function. Like a monopolistically competitive 
industry, CV invariably has quite a few 
candidates, and the candidates are 
differentiated. Also, cumulative voting 
engenders vigorous competition, in which 
candidates try to carve out a niche to remain 
successful, just as firms do in the market. The 
two distinguishing characteristics of 
cumulative voting in the monopolistic 
competition paradigm are competition and 
differentiation. . 
Because cumulative voting has more than 
one seat at stake in an election, typically more 
candidates will compete for office, thus 
making elections more competitive. The 
cumulative aspect of the process, in which 
voters are able to "plump"[lS] votes, allows a 
certain degree of preference intensity 
revelation. The introduction of cardinal 
preferences into the electoral market makes 
demand as expressed in vote totals more 
reflective ofthe "true demand" ofa pluralistic 
political society, and therefore more 
competitive (Cole, Taebel, and Engstrom, 
1990). Also, cumulative voting has relatively 
low entry barriers, causing real and potential 
competition to increase. Foremost among 
these is its low exclusion threshold. 
Institutional barriers will also be lower to the 
degree that a more differentiated government 
monopoly will face higher marginal costs in 
producing legislation, thus will be unable to 
pass restrictive rules (Crain, Holcombe, and 
Tollison, 1979). In addition, the preservation 
of natural political boundaries eliminates the 
barrier erected by arbitrary apportionment. 
Finally, the tendency away from stable two 
party competition will reduce the possibility of 
political collusion that prevents third parties 
from effectively entering the process and will 
diminish the institutionalized political party 
barriers. 
Differentiation will occur in a cumulative 
voting system because there is no presumption 
of two party or two candidate competition, 
thus Cox's formulation that multiple candidate 
races will not converge holds (1987). In fact, 
"the Eaton-Lipsey analysis demonstrates the 
limited generalizability ofHotelling's Principle 
of Minimum Differentiation," thus firms in 
multiple candidate races, "... need not 
collectively confront the consumer with 'an 
Because CV has more than 
one seat at stake in an 
election, typically more 
candidates will compete for 
office, thus making elections 
more competitive. 
excessive sameness."' (Shepsle and Cohen 
1990, p. 20). This analysis predicts that 
competitors will spread out along the policy 
continuum, rather than bunching at the median 
position. 
IV. EVIDENCE 
Since its inception, cumulative voting has 
primarily been seen as a practical and fair way 
to vote in jurisdiction that cannot agree to a 
voting procedure because of the fear of 
factionalism or majority tyranny. In its first 
real-world usages, on the local level in parts of 
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England and in South Africa during the last 
third ofthe nineteenth century, its results were 
generally favorable, allowing minorities to be 
represented and reducing factionalism 
(Lakeman 1974, pp. 87-90). The most 
sustained usage ofcumulative voting is found 
in minois where the system was used to elect 
the lower body ofthe legislature between 1870 
and 1980. Originally instituted to mitigate the 
geopolitical polarization of the state into a 
pro-union Republican northern half and a 
anti-union Democratic southern halffollowing 
the civil war, CV was designed to address "the 
injustice and inequalities of majority rule" 
(Everson et al 1982, p. 5). The system 
"worked" in that it allowed the second party in 
each half of the state to have representation. 
Many of the theories about CV are also 
confirmed by the Illinois experience. 
Cumulative voting did provide more 
proportional representation, did not 
overrepresent the majority, and increased the 
role of the minority in governing. The 
complaints about the lllinois experience, as to 
its non-compeiitiveness and lack ofcandidates, 
are not related to CV itself but rather are a 
function of the strong party control and 
collusion ofthe political process, and thus can 
be dismissed. Furthermore, the reasons for the 
systems repeal in 1980 were connected to 
voter anger over a pay increase, rather 
substantive complaints about the system itself: 
The conclusion reached by many scholars is 
that CV in Dlinois did "prevent the tyranny of 
an overwhelming majority" (Everson et al 
1982; Kuklinski 1973). The long use of 
cumulative voting by corporations to elect 
boards of directors further attests to the 
usefulness of the system as better way to 
represent an electorate (Guinier 1994, Note 
1982). 
The most recent uses of CV have come in 
response to violations of the Voting Rights 
Act's prohibition against minority vote 
dilution. In Alamogordo, New Mexico, where 
Latinos and Blacks have seen their votes 
diluted and the lack ofgeographic segregation 
prevents effective districting, CV is being 
employed to ensure better minority 
representation. The institution of the system 
resulted in a Latino woman being elected 
at-large in the first election, mostly on the 
strength of Latino voters (Cole, Taebel, and 
Engstrom 1990). Likewise, a school district in 
South Dakota has seen positive results, in 
terms of Native American representation, by 
changing to cumulative voting (Engstrom and 
Barrilleaux, 1991). Finally, some Alabama 
localities, including Chilton County, have 
experimented with cumulative voting .to 
increase black representation. Surprisingly, not 
only did black representation jump after the 
institution ofthis system, but the Republicans, 
another under-represented group in rural 
Alabama, also increased their representation 
(Still, 1992). Together, the evidence of 
cumulative voting usage indicates that it is an 
effective tool for improving minority 
representation. 
v. CONCLUSION 
This study ofcumulative voting and single 
member district plurality rule attempted to use 
a novel application of industrial organization 
economic theory to explain why cumulative 
voting is a superior electoral system. The 
industrial organization paradigm, by providing 
concepts, such as oligopoly, monopolistic 
competition, and entry barriers, lends· further 
insight into the advantages of cumulative 
voting, in tenns ofcompetition, representation, 
and fairness. By positing SMD plurality rule as 
an oligopolistic political market structure and 
CV as monopolistically competitive one, it was 
determined that CV was more competitive, 
representative, and fair, as an electoral system. 
This conclusion was buffeted by many 
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theoretical arguments coming from the 
literature surrounding voting rights, public 
choice, and voting theory. Furthermore, the 
field research done on actual instances of 
cumulative voting usage also lends credence to 
the conclusions drawn. Certainly further 
empirical research is needed concerning 
cumulative voting, and as more localities 
become more familiar with CV, the evidence 
surrounding its real world effects will improve. 
But, policy implications can be drawn from 
this preliminary study. 
Cumulative voting should be considered as 
a viable electoral strategy for all types and 
levels of elections that simultaneously elect 
multiple candidates. This would as a whole 
improve American elections,--in terms of-­
representation, competition, and fairness, three 
qualities that are essential to a well functioning 
democracy. This recommendation can be taken 
further for those localities that are 
experiencing destructive factionali~m ·or 
minority exclusion and majority dominance. 
Simply put, cumulative voting should be 
instituted as soon as possible in these areas 
because although not a panacea, it certainly 
has proved useful in equitably easing the 
tensions that arise in those situations. As the 
United States moves toward a more 
integrated, culturally diverse future, 
cumulative voting should prove to be an 
integral part ofthe American electoral system. 
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NOTES 
[1] A third fonnula is the majoritarian system 
which requires that the winner be able to beat 
all other candldates or parties combined, 
meaning the winner has to gamer at least fifty 
percent ofthe votes. The difficult ofachieving 
this feat has made majoritarian systems rare, 
and thus it has been left out. 
[2] In both CV and SMD plurality he 
exclusion threshold is 1/(1+S), where S is·the 
number ofseats available in the election. 
[3] Prior to the early sixties when a series of 
court cases, (Gomillion v. Lightfoot (1960), 
Baker v. Carr (1962), Gray v. Sanders (1963), 
Wesberry v. Sanders (1964), and Reynolds v. 
Sims (1964)) created the "one man one vote" 
standard, districts did not have to be, and were 
rarely, equally populated. 
[4] Through the process of reapportionment, 
districts are redrawn to adjust to population 
shifts on a regular basis. In America this 
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occurs every ten years, coinciding with the 
census. 
[5] In United Jewish Organizations v. Carey 
(1977) this was precisely the issue. In creating • 
a minority majority black district in New York 
a minority majority Jewish district had to be 
dismantled, causing quite a conflict between 
calls for fair representatio~ among both 
groups. 
[6] The cube law predicts that the majority 
party will be over represented because (1-8)/8 
= [(1-V)N]K where 8 is the percentage of 
seats won by the party, and V is the 
percentage votes received by the party and K 
is 3, when two parties have 90% ofthe vote. 
[7] A wasted vote can be defined as a vote that 
does not elect a candidate. Thus any vote that 
is superfluous for the winner, or goes to the 
loser is wasted. 
[8] The practice ofplacing all ofone's votes on 
a single candidate is called plumping. 
[9] A geopolitical unit is geographic area 
defined by a political jurisdiction. For example, 
towns, counties, and states all can be 
considered geopolitical units. In addition, 
voting districts can also be considered a 
geopolitical unit, but many times the arbitrary 
and illogical definition of these districts 
prevents them from being genuine geopolitical 
units, that have an identity apart from their 
role in the electoral process. 
[10] Following Crain, Holcombe, and Tollison 
(1979), marginal cost would be ~onstant 
because each additional policy action within a 
given government involves the same 
"processing and approval procedures"(54-s). 
But average cost would be declining because 
there is a fixed cost of gaining control of the 
monopoly (government). Government output 
in terms ofpolicy etc. would be determined by 
marginal valuation and the average cost 
(graph). Furthermore, the fixed cost can be 
expected to be quite high and thereby impose 
a kind. ofentry barrier that protects the status 
quo government from competition for its 
monopoly rights. 
[11] Arrow proved that no system of 
aggregating society's preferences could be 
devised that would meet five innocuous 
requirements. 
[12] These benefits include not only the 
monetary rewards ofgovernment service, but 
also the prestige and other psychic benefits of 
government positions. Monopoly power also 
entails the ability ofa legislator to deviate from 
the societally optimal production of services, 
in favor of the most personally profitable 
production point. 
[13] The importance of this kind of political 
rear guard maneuver is abundantly clear-in the '~'...-.-. 
recent history of the Republican party. In 
1964, Bany Goldwater, in essence, outflanked 
the Rockefeller Republicans, and by 1980 the 
conservatives had taken complete control of 
the party. George Bush's move to the right 
after difficulties with the Buchanan faction of 
his party in 1992 is an example of an attempt 
to head off a flanking action. 
[14] The experience of the Republican and 
Whig parties between 1856 and 1864 is a good 
example ofthis effect. 
[15] Plumping is the act ofplacing all ofone's 
votes on one candidate. 
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